Suchergebnisse

1. Toward a broader theory of deterrence -- 2. The United States and China, 1959-1966 -- 3. The Soviet Union and China, 1969 -- 4. Israel and Iraq, 1977-1981 -- 5. The United States and North Korea, 1992-1994 -- 6. The United States and Soviet Union, 1962 -- 7. Putting the pieces together.

The text explores various theoretical approaches to the concept of deterrence. It links deterrence with other strategies that utilize a threat of military action to achieve political goals. Furthermore, the difference between deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial is highlighted in the article. To develop the debate further, the various roles of nuclear weapons in deterrence are examined, while four types of nuclear deterrence strategies - namely nuclear primacy, maximum assured destruction, minimum assured destruction, and automatic deterrence - are distinguished. The text shows the unique role of the strategy of nuclear primacy. This strategy relies on denial, while the conceptual foundations of the other three strategies lie in punishment, and it is well suited not only for deterrence, but also for compellence, as it eliminates mutuality from the deterrence relation. Adapted from the source document.

Using the empirical case of the Iranian nuclear program, the presented text is intended to test and conceptualize the security model of nuclear weapons proliferation, as it was outlined by Scott Sagan. As a byproduct of alternative explanations, the security model offers an implied interpretation rather than a clear conceptualization. A defensive reaction to a perceived threat from another nation is inherently expected within the security model. The security related but offensive intent is not appropriately covered by the model, though. Assuming that a defensive purpose requires a present danger from the other nation and the ability of a prospective arsenal to effectively challenge this danger, the two parts of the article's body are respectively devoted to two issues: first, it is examined whether the threat perceived by Iran actually exists, and second, the ability of the arsenal to deter opponents is subsequently addressed within the framework of nuclear strategy. Adapted from the source document.

This article deals with the concept of indirect coercion as a distinct type of coercive strategy involving three actors. We introduce a taxonomy of triangular strategies commonly employed in international politics: 'hostage-taking', 'patron-client' and 'composite' strategies. These three types of indirect coercion cover different ways in how the coercer draws the intermediary actor in the process of coercive bargaining to enhance his leverage over the target. For each type, we conduct a plausibility probe to study these dynamics on short empirical case studies. We argue that our conceptualisation of indirect coercion opens new avenues for research into deterrence and compellence in contemporary world politics.

The article conceptually explains the notion of strategy. Drawing on its understanding by well-established authorities like Carl von Clausewitz, Basil Liddel Hart, André Beaufre, or Colin Gray, the authors discuss strengths and weaknesses of various views. Furthermore, the article employs Arthur Lykke's definition of strategy to demonstrate various conceptual requirements. Strategy is thus perceived as the relationship among means, ends, and ways. Crucial implications for a development of the Czech strategic documents are further examined. The article argues that, the vital importance of coherent interconnection of all the afore-mentioned parts of the strategy has been so far neglected in this process. It is suggested that particular attention should be paid to the clear formulation of a goal, which is the prerequisite for any meaningful strategy. However, any goals must be developed with the close relation to the available or potentially attainable resources, and purposeful ways how to employ them. The whole process is best described as the hermeneutic circle.

This article introduces the first comprehensive dataset of frozen conflicts in world politics. It draws on a new, broader conceptualization of frozen conflicts that revolves around an unresolved core issue between the warring parties and transcends the common understanding of frozen conflicts as a recent, post-Soviet phenomenon. The authors identify 42 cases of such conflicts between 1946 and 2011 that include conflict dyads involving both regular states and 'de facto states'. The article describes the process of dataset construction, presents summary statistics, and identifies key patterns concerning conflict onset, escalation, and resolution. In addition, it provides a comparison of the dataset with enduring rivalries and strategic rivalries to situate it within existing research on conflict escalation and conflict resolution. The dataset is presented in a cross-sectional format compatible with the Correlates of War and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program that can be used by other researchers in peace and conflict studies to provide new insights into the dynamics of frozen conflicts.

This article offers systematic view of a process of identification of security threats and, subsequently, their use in the making of strategic documents, notably the Security Strategy of the Czech Republic. It is not the aim of the authors to name or define such threats, but to present the process itself. It is paramount to any credible security strategy that it deals with the threat identification in the most precise fashion. The authors take reservations against the "catalogue" approach and claim the processes of prioritization and categorization to be essential for any policies derived from the security strategy, especially in times of economic need. It is also the 2011 final paper of the project "Trends, Risks, and Scenarios of the Security Developments in the World, Europe, and the Czech Republic - Impacts on the Policy and Security System of the Czech Republic" (TRS / VG20102013009).